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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

War Aims and Peace Aims

AYNARD KRUEGER · T. V. SMITH · W. LLOYD WARNER

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, April 13, 1941, at 1:30 P.M., Central Standard Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS

MR. SMITH: This is the anniversary of Thomas Jefferson's birthday—the 198th anniversary, I believe, of the birth of the author of the Declaration of Independence.

"As members of the universal community of mankind," said Jefferson on a memorable occasion, "standing in high and responsible relation with them, it is our sacred duty to suppress passions among ourselves and not to blast the confidence we have inspired of proof that a government of reason is better than one of force."

MR. WARNER: That is an extraordinarily appropriate remark for this very lovely Easter morning—appropriate in one sense and in another sense very inappropriate. When one remembers that the brotherhood of mankind is a shambles at the present time, when one remembers that force is rampant everywhere, it seems singularly inappropriate.

If you remember, about two years ago this Easter morning the fascist power of Italy, backed up by Germany, invaded Albania; one year ago the peaceful people in Holland and the peaceful people in Belgium had their peace overturned by the Nazi invasion of the Lowlands.[1] This morning we see ourselves sitting here peacefully. I wonder what it is going to be like one year from now.

[1] *Italian troops invaded Albania April 7, 1939 (Good Friday); German troops invaded Denmark and Norway April 9, 1940, and Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland on May 10, 1940; Nazi soldiers marched into Greece and Yugoslavia April 6, 1941.*

MR. KRUEGER: I agree with you, Warner, that Easter of 1940 was "lousy," and Easter of 1941—from the standpoint of the international situation—does not show much peace. I don't know what Easter of 1942 will be like, but I have a hunch that what it will be like will be closely related to what we are discussing this morning: war aims and peace aims.

MR. SMITH: There is no doubt about that, but, since we are dealing with a somewhat confused subject—war aims and peace aims—do you mind if I propose that we divide it under three heads and discuss: First, what are the declared war aims; second, should further peace aims be declared now by the belligerents; and, third, should America condition further war aid upon declaration of peace aims?

First: What are the declared war aims?

MR. KRUEGER: The declared war aims, I think, are somewhat different now than they were in the early part of the war—say in September, 1939. As far as I can tell at the moment, both Britain and Germany are pretty well content to let the question of war aims ride with the statement that they are out to defeat the enemy.

MR. SMITH: What were they doing then—you say, "now they are out to defeat the enemy?"

MR. KRUEGER: Right now that is about all I can see in the declared war aims of either Britain or Germany.

MR. SMITH: Were other aims declared in 1939, Warner?

MR. WARNER: I think it is quite clear that the Nazis from the beginning had one war aim; namely, to conquer the world and to rule it. I think, on the other hand, that the war aims of the Allies have shifted as the war has gone along, and I agree with Krueger that they have become constantly more vague.

MR. KRUEGER: Certainly the war aims of Britain and France in September of 1939 (it was the morning of a University of Chicago

ROUND TABLE, I think, when those declarations of war were made) ran in terms of the defense of Poland, the maintenance of the integrity of various countries in Central Europe, and so on. I hear very little now, in the important statements by government officials in Britain, about the restoration of the *status quo* of 1939. I think the war aims have become more vague.

MR. WARNER: What it amounts to is this. As the war has progressed, and the fight has become more fierce and much more difficult, the Allies have been much more interested in simply winning the war than in speaking of definite peace aims. In other words, from the beginning the Allies have wished to maintain the *status quo* while not saying very much about it; and Germany, on the other hand, wanted to turn it upside down.

MR. SMITH: I like to concede the aims of the two in this way: Germany is out to make the world better, as *she* sees it, by overturning the world that existed in 1939. The British are now out not to make the world *better* but to keep it from being made *worse*, which they think it will be if Germany wins.

MR. WARNER: I am awfully glad to hear you say that, Smith. I agree completely!

MR. SMITH: There are times when you don't try to make things better; when if you can keep them from getting worse you are extraordinarily fortunate. So much, then, for the war aims in 1939, and, at the present, of the two warring powers. Should further peace aims be declared now by the belligerents?

MR. WARNER: Certainly not!

MR. KRUEGER: I think they certainly should be!

MR. SMITH: Listen here! Warner, you say no; Krueger, you say yes. "Yes" is not enough; "no" is not enough.

MR. WARNER: I think it would be exceedingly dangerous for the United States to demand that the belligerent powers declare peace aims at the present moment. England is up to one thing, namely, the winning of the war. A declaration of peace aims at the present time would be likely to act as propaganda for Germany. Why? Because it would mean that Germany then could take advantage of the division between the peoples in the democracies and work upon that.

MR. SMITH: I am inclined to agree with that, unless Krueger can sway me over.

MR. KRUEGER: I'll try it! I think that further peace aims ought to be declared now by the belligerents, and particularly by Britain, because I don't believe that mere declarations in favor of the restoration of the *status quo* or of keeping things from getting worse are enough to motivate the people who must be motivated; in other words, to prevent the whole world from going fascist. I mean that the people who must overthrow fascism and wipe it off the face of the earth (if it is going to be wiped off) must have something more to struggle for than merely the restoration of the world as it was in 1939.

MR. WARNER: I don't agree with that. It doesn't make sense to me. I don't know whether you agree with it or not; but it seems to me if I were a Rumanian, if I were a Bulgarian, if I were a Czechoslovakian or a Pole, I would be very interested at the present time in merely seeing Great Britain win, because I'd know then that I had a chance to be a free man again.[2]

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[2] *Since the Munich agreement of 1938, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France have come under German or Italian domination; in addition, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have signed the Axis pact and become allies of Germany, and Greece and Yugoslavia are now fighting*

MR. SMITH: I feel the same way. I am not out for perfectionism when I am in danger of falling into hell. I am all for keeping out of hell, myself.

MR. KRUEGER: But wouldn't you recognize that in these great passages in the world's history something more than merely a return to an old *status quo* is necessary? You don't stir men with that kind of a slogan, or with that kind of a statement of war aims. It isn't enough for the British merely to say, "We are out to defend the British Isles." People can do great things out of fear, but they can't do things that are great enough.

MR. WARNER: I think that is just a little bit nonsensical, if you will excuse me for saying so. It seems to me that if I were in a concentration camp in Czechoslovakia because I was a Czech, and for no other reason, and could get out of that concentration camp if the British were victorious, I would be perfectly satisfied to know that the British were winning the war.

MR. SMITH: Fear is surely one of the greatest motives in human life, and I'll bet the Czechoslovakians, if they could get things half as good as they were in 1938, would be tickled to death. That constitutes an amazing motive.

MR. KRUEGER: But "half as good as they were in 1938" or *completely* as good as they were in 1938 is not enough to organize a post-war world in such a way that peace may be maintained in any stable manner, and I don't believe that people will be willing over a

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against Axis control. Six months before Munich, Austria passed under German control, and in 1940 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were absorbed by the Soviet Union. The only nations in Europe not yet actively involved in war are Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the smaller principalities such as Andorra and Monaco. Russia and Turkey, Asiatic as well as European powers, remain outside the conflict.

very long period of time to make the sacrifices which are required in large-scale war unless they have before them some Holy Grail toward which they are struggling. It must be stated in something more than in selfish terms, or in something more than in terms of a return to the good old days.

MR. WARNER: You people with such logic are always after heaven and not willing to accept the world as it is at the present time with all of its advantages and disadvantages.

MR. SMITH: After all, you know, to keep out of hell (I repeat) is a tremendous motivation in human experience, and the danger of seeking perfection now is that you will divide the forces trying to keep out of hell and all of us will land there.

MR. KRUEGER: That is the major part of your argument. You are not really arguing that a return to the *status quo* of 1939 is enough really to move people; you are arguing that if war aims or peace aims were started now—beyond the ordinary war aim of licking the enemy—it would divide people. I am inclined to think you are right about that in a certain way. That is, if there were a declaration of peace aims by Britain I think it would split the people in this country who are now supporting American intervention in the war.[3]

MR. WARNER: As far as I am concerned (and I believe I speak for a large body of American opinion) it does not matter what the war aims of Great Britain or of Germany are at the present time. As far as I am concerned I would go into the war at this very moment. I believe the thing upon which Americans must make up their minds is that they know that one side is better than the other, that one side has a kind of system of ideals that they prefer, and

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[3] *For a further exposition of this view, see the* ROUND TABLE *broadcast of December 8, 1940, "Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?"*

that we ought to back them up with everything we've got: not only just give them supplies, but *convoy;* and, if necessary, *war.*

MR. KRUEGER: You'll get a chance to declare war, I suppose, before this conversation is over. That isn't the question we are discussing at the moment.

MR. SMITH: May I say, Krueger, that next Sunday the ROUND TABLE is going to discuss this subject specifically: "Which Road for America—Staying out of War or a Military Defeat of Germany?"[4] We may come to that later, so let's postpone getting into war at once.

MR. WARNER: I want my chance later, if you don't mind.

MR. SMITH: All right! You'll have your chance.

MR. KRUEGER: What I should like to do now is to spell out to Warner a further statement of what I mean. Hitler has proposed a "New Order." It is a new order which is far more impressive than it is attractive, but it is very impressive. Unless on the other side of this war there is also a new order which can be spelled out in very attractive terms, I think the kind of new order you are going to have is the kind that Hitler proposes.

MR. SMITH: If we could do it without dividing the forces fighting to maintain what was fairly good as compared with what Germany offers, well and good; but I wonder, Warner, what in the world he has in mind in thinking you can provide a perfectionalism now without making the struggle itself weaker?

MR. KRUEGER: This word "perfectionalism," I think, is one that has been thrown around a little too much here. Whenever anyone proposes any kind of an improvement in anything, that doesn't necessarily prove he is a perfectionist, does it?

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[4] *See the back cover of this transcript for the names of speakers who will discuss this topic and for reading suggestions.*

MR. SMITH: No, not at all; but in a situation where you are struggling to keep from getting worse all the time almost anything that distracts attention from that constitutes a perfectionalism in that situation, doesn't it?

MR. WARNER: When it isn't a realizable choice, then it seems to me it smacks of perfectionalism.

MR. SMITH: Let's see if he has some "realizable choice."

MR. KRUEGER: I'll give you one, and it is one that I think won't have the effect of dividing people who are supporting the forces of righteousness. I believe that the elimination of imperialism is a condition of any kind of a decent world-order in the future. I believe that simply a declaration of that kind must be backed up by deeds before people will believe it. I believe, therefore, that Britain ought to give freedom to India at the present time as a token of a real intention, of a willingness to develop a world-order.

MR. SMITH: Freedom for India! So the Indians can crucify one another across the religious and cast lines, I suppose, when they ought to be seeking to defeat their worst enemy, Germany!

MR. WARNER: Krueger seems to be willing to give up a chance to preserve ourselves from far worse things than we have at the present time, to give up our present democracy, merely to free the Indians! Somehow or other—while I am interested in the Indians—I can't take them so seriously. I am concerned about the United States here and now!

MR. KRUEGER: We are talking about peace aims, Warner, and if I understood you correctly a moment ago you were on the point of asking people in this country to make tremendous sacrifices in terms of material and in terms of men.

MR. SMITH: I am not going to let him declare war just now, Krueger.

MR. KRUEGER: He told us he was going to do that later.

MR. SMITH: Maybe a little later.

MR. KRUEGER: It seems to me that before you would be willing to pay that kind of a price you would want to know a little bit about what it is being done for. Surely you are not naïve enough simply to take verbal declaration (although I understand you are opposed to them being made, too) without some delivery in terms of deeds. What would you have against the extension to India of the same kind of independence the United States won only by war in 1776?

MR. WARNER: I have none, Krueger, but I would like to ask you a question. I would like to ask you, Would you do nothing to help Britain win this war if she did not release the Indians?

MR. KRUEGER: That is a very satisfactory distractor.

MR. WARNER: No, I'm asking you: Would you? You are making this a fundamental point. What would you do about it?

MR. KRUEGER: Here is what I would do: I would say we will not go further into this thing until there is something to show that the post-war order will be a more satisfactory one than the pre-war order, which was not sufficiently good.

MR. WARNER: Then you want Britain defeated?

MR. KRUEGER: No, I beg your pardon! I don't think there is any kind of logic in that reasoning.

MR. WARNER: Would you rather have Germany win or would you rather have Britain win?

MR. KRUEGER: I would rather have Britain win than have Germany win; but I don't think the alternative is in those terms. I think you will face a long war in which you will have a hard time . . . .

MR. WARNER: Smith, people on that side always have a large number of "buts" and their "buts" are awfully big!

MR. KRUEGER: Maybe it is because you don't give me a chance to finish my sentences, Warner. I don't think the alternative is a British victory or a German victory, because I think it is quite likely to be a long war in which we will have a hard time telling who won.

MR. WARNER: What military expert are you quoting now?

MR. KRUEGER: There are some fairly good grounds for believing that. After all, even the first World War lasted for four years. You have seen only a year and a half of this war.

MR. WARNER: It sounds like paradise to me, Smith!

MR. SMITH: But my great fear is that in any declaration of peace aims as against war aims we would go too far. I'd hate to see promised, for instance, what Woodrow Wilson promised in the other war: the maintaining of the national sovereignty of all the peoples of Europe, and I think India would do ten times worse than that to declare for its sovereignty now.

MR. WARNER: I think that is an excellent point. The present disillusionment of the world is partly due to the fact that we had all sorts of very elaborate, highly idealistic peace aims declared which nobody could come through on.

MR. KRUEGER: I'd like to make a deal with both of you.

MR. SMITH: Let it be an honorable one!

MR. KRUEGER: All right! If you could go on into this war, and if you could do it without telling people that it was a war for democracy or a war for liberation or a war for constitutionalism, then you would not be engaging in hypocrisy. But do you think there is any chance of a government going into war without spelling

out peace aims that are incompatible with what is going to happen later?

MR. SMITH: It has already done that; as a matter of fact, we are *in*.

Now, while we have agreed on the declared war aims of the several belligerents, we have developed a fundamental difference of opinion on the second point: Should further peace aims be declared now by the belligerents? Do you mind if I switch you for a moment to the second point and get America into it? I would like to do it, if I may—in honor of Easter and Thomas Jefferson's birthday—by quoting what we'd all like, Krueger, from the greatest American woman poet, Emily Dickinson. She said:

"I had no time to hate,
Because the grave would hinder me;
And life was not so ample
I could finish enmity.
Nor had I time to love;
But, since some industry must be,
The little toil of love
I thought was large enough for me."

We'd all like to make it a labor of love, but we are at war. The world is at war.

MR. WARNER: May I interrupt a moment? Krueger, occasionally there are times when we social scientists can predict. We both predicted we would get a poem from our honorable colleague at some point in this broadcast.

MR. KRUEGER: Not only that, but we came prepared for it. Here's the answer:

"T. V. is the name of my hero;
Instead of fiddling, this Nero
Is never averse to quoting some verse,
Though its relation to the topic be zero!"

MR. SMITH: Not at all, Krueger! After all, we are in a situation in which we wish for the best; but we've got to defend ourselves against the worst. Let me ask you now, colleagues: Should America condition further war aid upon declaration of peace aims now by the belligerents?

MR. WARNER: I say no, let's go in!

MR. KRUEGER: I say yes, further American aid should be conditioned not only upon declaration of peace aims but upon at least token payments upon those declarations. That is, a certain amount of deeds to back up the words.

MR. SMITH: The trouble is that you won't have words, and it is no time for deeds now except the deed of winning the right to be free and determining what the content of freedom shall be hereafter.

MR. KRUEGER: There is a rather fundamental disagreement between us on that, I think.

MR. SMITH: Clearly!

MR. KRUEGER: I take the position that the character of the post-war world is not going to be determined by these declarations of war aims or by the declaration of peace aims that none of us are really enthusiastic about but by the course of the war itself. That is, the things that are done during the war are the things that are going to survive after the war. If you tell us that you can't make any kind of progress toward real democracy and toward real liberty during the war, you are not going to make it live.

MR. WARNER: Is that a sentence or a paragraph? I'd like to put it this way: What is important at the present time is for our country not to force Britain or any of the other Allies to take a peace stand, to declare their peace aims; but I think it is very advisable for us Americans to discuss possible peace terms.

REGIONAL TRADE IN PEACE AND WAR





In peace or war the United States buys and sells in all parts of the world. In this trade comparison the world has been divided into eight regions: the United States; Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R. but including Turkey; Latin America; Southern South America; Canada; Asia; Africa; and the U.S.S.R. The maps indicate the value of import and export relationships between the United States and these regions and shifts in trade which have occurred since the war began.

MR. SMITH: To keep on the subject now, gentlemen, I see four alternatives for America, and I think I see where Krueger falls:

1. We could have isolation of the United States,
2. We could have North and South American unity,
3. We could have union of the United States with the British Commonwealth, or
4. We might have a collective system.

Krueger is not in favor now of America's helping to win the war unless there is some declaration of peace aims as indicated, for instance, by freeing India.

MR. WARNER: But Krueger, the way you talk, although you attempt to defend India, it seems to me what you are trying to do is to state an isolationist policy for the United States.

MR. SMITH: I think so, too.

MR. WARNER: It looks to me as though you are in favor of the first alternative.

MR. KRUEGER: It is a policy of isolation from the war—certainly! I have always been in favor of isolation from the war and in favor of cooperation.

MR. SMITH: Let Hitler win the war and you will be isolated for good with a worse war situation!

MR. KRUEGER: You are agreeing with Warner, then, that the discussion of peace aims should really be postponed until after the war is over.

MR. SMITH: Peace aims could only be propaganda now in which nobody could believe, and that would be the only purpose of announcing them. The effect on us would be to drive us further into isolation.

MR. WARNER: I should like to ask the question, What would it mean for the United States to take a position of isolation after the war? Let us suppose that the Allies win.

MR. KRUEGER: It would mean for the United States to try to do the impossible, I think. I don't think isolation for the United States is possible. I don't think it is compatible with our high standard of living or with the maintenance of a democratic political order.

MR. SMITH: Well, Warner, he is not in favor of isolation. We will take his word. He is in favor of North and South American unity and isolation for these two continents.

MR. WARNER: But look, Smith! What surprises me so much is that he is talking about isolationism, and so on, and is against it. Then after the war he says that it is impossible for the United States to be isolated. Those two arguments don't make sense.

MR. KRUEGER: You don't mean to imply—do you, Warner —that a country has to get into every war that comes along?

MR. WARNER: I mean only this: that when the whole world is at war, and when it is necessary for us to fill our proper place in that war, if it is necessary for us to go into the war then I think we should.

MR. KRUEGER: Of course, I'd accept that statement, too; but I don't think it is necessary, because I don't think it would serve the ends that I'd like to see served in terms of a post-war world. I don't think isolation is possible, and I don't think either of you do.

MR. SMITH: I think, then, we'd agree that if Hitler wins it will be either 1, 2, or 3: isolation of the United States; North and South American unity; or union of the United States with the British Commonwealth; whereas, if Britain wins we might do either one of those, but we'd have a chance at the last alternative, namely, a col-

lective system in which peace could be had under democratic principles.

MR. WARNER: Certainly, but I'd like to discuss some of the alternatives facing us. We have discussed isolation; it might be well to talk about North American and South American solidarity.

MR. KRUEGER: I think what we might do is simply declare in favor of it, but I'd like to add this one reservation with regard to both Western Hemisphere solidarity, as you term it, and union with Britain: that it not be just an extension of the same kind of imperialism which I think has been largely responsible for getting us into this jam.

MR. SMITH: All the system you could have in the world itself is that kind of imperialism unless Great Britain wins. Whereas if she wins, and wins through our aid, we have a chance of building a collective system in which we could establish real peace in the world.

MR. WARNER: You mean a world collective system?

MR. SMITH: Yes, exactly! A League of Nations, if you will, Warner, though I don't like your looks when I pronounce that name.

MR. WARNER: I confess I frown because, after all, the League of Nations was such a complete fiasco that I'd hate to see us get into that sort of thing again.

MR. KRUEGER: But why was it a fiasco? Would you agree with this statement: the League of Nations, in limiting national sovereignty in favor of international organization, attempted not too much but too little, and that the world organization of the future must be stronger rather than weaker than the League of Nations? That is, national sovereignty in the future, I think, ought to become a thing of the past.

MR. SMITH: That is one thing I had in mind in speaking of Woodrow Wilson. We don't want, in our peace aims, to promise the small countries of Europe that they can each be a sovereign nation. That will thwart any sort of collective peace.

MR. WARNER: I think I agree with both of you. We ought to limit national sovereignty if we are going to have any kind of workable collective system. On the other hand, I think we ought to take care to protect the rights of people to teach their children to live in the old traditions of their people, with their own language, ways of life, and so on. That does not mean that they would have to have a separate political state with complete national sovereignty.[5]

MR. KRUEGER: As a matter of fact, I think there is very good evidence that you can't maintain national autonomy or cultural autonomy unless there are limitations on the power of the national state. I am interested in seeing to it that as the power of the national state is limited it is done voluntarily in favor of world federation rather than in the way Hitler is doing it. Hitler is doing it the way he is because the rest of the world failed so long to do it in a decent way.

MR. SMITH: And he is destroying cultural autonomy. What I would like to see us do—and I will say this one thing for Hitler—is to maintain the system of advantages which Hitler has established in Europe; at least that much.

MR. WARNER: You mean to say, giving people a chance to collaborate across national lines rather than the type of . . . .

MR. SMITH: Rather than do what he is doing we ought to have cultural autonomy, but we ought to get rid (as he is getting rid) of this business of sovereignty in Europe.

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[5] *For a general discussion of this topic see the* ROUND TABLE *"Must the World Unite?" broadcast March 17, 1940, before the invasion of Scandinavia and the fall of France.*

MR. WARNER: Let's be more specific about it. It seems to me we ought very quickly to eliminate tariff walls; we ought very quickly to eliminate some of the kinds of customs arrangements which we have; we ought to make it possible for people to pass freely across borders; we ought to eliminate a great many things which are interfering, at the present time, with international collaboration.

MR. KRUEGER: Either population movements should be freer or the control of them must be in the hands of a central authority that is not responsible to one national government. I think the monetary system must be international, too. I think the idea of a national state controlling its own monetary system is nonsense!

MR. SMITH: I am glad we have found something we can agree upon. Whether or not we think America ought to enter without further war aims declared, or peace aims declared, we all agree that we ought to have some sort of collective system after the war, with cultural autonomy, with a central police power, with central control of tariffs, populations, and so on. But will American back up that alternative or any other alternative short of isolation?

MR. WARNER: I hate to be pessimistic about that, but I am afraid that America won't be ready and won't be willing.

MR. KRUEGER: I think the people of this country are willing to do spectacular things. Warner wants them to declare war. According to the Gallup poll, about 83 per cent of them are opposed to doing that at the present time.

MR. WARNER: Wait a minute, now! Wait a minute! The Gallup poll can be quoted the other way. Over 70 per cent of the people are willing to do everything possible to aid Great Britain "short of war," and they are always willing to redefine that.[6]

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[6] *The Gallup (American Institute of Public Opinion) poll reported American attitudes in March, 1941, to be 83 per cent against going into*

MR. KRUEGER: Very well! The point I want to make is that you want people to do spectacular things. You want them to go to war.

MR. WARNER: I want them to live like human beings; like decent people.

MR. KRUEGER: I think that, if it is put to them properly, people would be willing to make the sacrifices of national sovereignty and to take on these other limitations of straight national control in order to get the kind of a world that would not be torn to pieces every twenty years with the kind of war that is going on now.

MR. SMITH: Whether or not we expect the belligerents to declare peace aims, we are agreed that American statesmen ought to teach the American people that there is a price to be paid for freedom after the war, whether we are in it or out of it.

MR. WARNER: I agree completely, and one of the ways to teach them how to pay that price is for them to go in and take their proper role and act like grown-up human beings.

MR. KRUEGER: With that statement I think I'd disagree. The price will come in terms of sacrifices of advantages which people now have over other people.

MR. SMITH: It seems that, while we can agree on a statement of what the war aims actually are, we can't agree on whether further peace aims should now be declared by the belligerents. Krueger thinks they ought to be; and you, Warner, think they ought not to be. But we are agreed that in the alternatives before the United States we ought not to have isolationism; we ought not

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the war, 17 per cent in favor. At the same time, 67 per cent were in favor of aid to Britain even at the risk of war, and 33 per cent thought it more important to stay out of war than to risk war by aiding Britain.

to content ourselves with union with the British Commonwealth. We've got to have some sort of international order; otherwise, the spirit of Easter with its broad charity, and the sweet reasonableness of Thomas Jefferson, whose birthday it is, will go down into the tomb.

SUGGESTED READINGS

England Speaks, New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. *Unofficial statements of British war aims in essays by E. M. Forster, A. A. Milne, A. S. Duncan-Jones, Ronald Knox, Harold J. Laski, and others.*

INGERSOLL, RALPH, "War and Peace Aims," *PM*, various March, 1941, issues. *The views of a leading American interventionist on war and peace aims in relation to America's present position.*

LASKI, HAROLD J., *Where Do We Go from Here?* New York: Viking Press, 1940. *A proclamation of democracy as the war aim of British labor.*

PATTERSON, ERNEST MINOR, editor, "When War Ends," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1940. *A series of articles on post-war reconstruction and the conditions of peace.*

"Peace Aims," *Fortune*, April, 1941. *The report of a three-day meeting of some twenty-five experts discussing the war, its aftermath, and America's relation to it and to the world which exists after it.*

"Two Worlds," *Nation*, March 22, 1941. *Eight articles dealing with the fate of Europe and the world if Hitler loses and if Hitler wins.*

"War Aims in War Propaganda," *Propaganda Analysis*, March 27, 1941. *The statement of war and peace aims as a weapon of propaganda discussed and analyzed with reference to various American groups and their propaganda techniques.*

The latest and most official statement of British war aims may be found in the address of Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States, delivered in New York March 25, 1941. Copies of this speech may be obtained from the British Library of Information, Rockefeller Center, New York City.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. How was Easter of 1939 and 1940 marked by violence? Page 2.
2. Declared war aims of the belligerents today are concentrated on what one objective, according to the ROUND TABLE participants? Page 3.
3. How is it suggested a British declaration of peace aims might help Germany? Page 5.
4. List some of the nationalities Professor Warner suggests want to see Britain win so they "may be free again." Page 5.
5. What specific action by Britain does Professor Krueger propose as a "token of a real intention . . . . to develop a world-order"? Page 9.
6. According to Professor Smith, what four alternatives face America as far as foreign policy is concerned? Page 16.
7. Professor Krueger feels America's high standard of living and democratic political order would be menaced most by which of the alternatives referred to in question 6? Page 17.
8. The future of national sovereignty ought to be what, according to the ROUND TABLE speakers? Page 19.
9. List two of the things "interfering at the present time with international collaboration" which, it is suggested, should be eliminated in any future world-order. Page 20.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 23.

*

1. Do you believe America should demand a further statement of war and peace aims from Great Britain before sending further aid to her? If so, and this statement were not made and Britain appeared to be losing because of the loss of American aid, would you still hold to that opinion?

2. Do you agree that any statement of war or peace aims now must have as its primary objective the aiding of the war effort and would therefore be essentially propagandistic in character, no matter how honest the intentions of its framers might be?

3. Summarize the declared war aims of Britain and of the Axis and give your interpretation of these aims and your idea of how they would work out if Britain wins and if the Axis wins.

4. Do you think a declaration of peace aims now by Britain would tend to cause division in the ranks of her population at home and her supporters in this and other nonbelligerent countries? If so, do you think that might be sufficient cause for not stating such aims?

5. It has been suggested that a statement of war and peace aims by Britain would aid the British cause, would bring it new defenders interested in building a new order after the war, and would create new enthusiasms for the war far stronger than would any aim limited to the "destruction of the enemy." Take one side of this suggestion and defend your viewpoint.

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "Balkan Blitzkrieg" April 6, 1941.*

*

Yugoslav Unity

I do believe that I know Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs (since . . . . I was born and lived in Trieste, Italy, close to the Yugoslav border, and my mother and sister still live there). . . . .

It is a fact (well-known not only in the Balkans) that Yugoslavs don't like the Italians. This dislike only recently has been officially covered by the shadow of a trade treaty between the two governments. But the Yugoslav is still hostile to the Italian, and the latter heartily reciprocates this feeling. When I say Yugoslavs, I mean Serbians, Croatians, Slovenians, alike. The three parties in Yugoslavia may have some trouble whenever it comes to the settlement of internal affairs, but whenever they have a quarrel with a foreign nation, you would be surprised at how quickly they unite against the common enemy. Serbians, Croatians, Slovenians, alike nourish old hatred against the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its continuation in Nazi Germany. They hate Italy mostly because of the annexation of Slavic-speaking territories and the harbor city of Spalato after World War I. Therefore, personally I am convinced that the Yugoslavs will fight together as one nation, with one will and one goal.

R. S. S., Kansas

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Expeditionary Forces

I have heard and appreciated many of your Sunday afternoon discussions, and it is quite in this spirit of appreciation that I write to comment on one of the statements made in the discussion today. One of the speakers quoted a French gentleman's observation on Britain's ineffective handling of expeditionary forces. My mind reverts immediately to Franco-British collaboration in the Crimean War, and I do not know which army was more woefully handled, the French army or the British; to the Dardanelles fiasco, and I do not know how anything could be considered more inept than the British management of this if it had not been for the part played by the French government and military. My mind reverts to the bloody frontal attacks in the West, 1915–18, and I

do not know which was the worse, the French or the British—but I do know we broke through at the last, August to November, 1918. Then there are Wellington's campaign in Spain and the Battle of Waterloo.

I should like to make this further observation: England has not been a militaristic nation and, for any war of consequence, has had to build an army.

It is only right that each man should speak for himself, and for his country, and I am sure the gentleman in question spoke as he felt and saw things. Only after a free discussion can we shake hands.

W. K., Manitoba

*

Yugoslavia

Not one of the participants explained the aversion of the Croats and Slovenes against the Serbs. It was said that it was due to the difference in religion, the Croats and Slovenes being Roman Catholic and the Serbs Greek Orthodox. But in these days of less religious friction and greater racial or national affinities that difference is not the main reason. The main reason is that both Croats and Slovenes have belonged to the Hapsburg Empire for many centuries and are used to honest administrations and home rule, running their own affairs, whereas the Serbs, who belonged to the Ottoman Empire for nearly 500 years, are graft-ridden, were always open to bribery, exploited their offices for their personal gain, were dishonest, inefficient, and dirty, and, worst of all, held all the important posts in Slovene and Croat territory. It is a case of an inferior civilization ruling a superior one, of Orientalism dominating Occidentalism.

It was also not brought out that Yugoslavia is an artificial state which owed its origin to the American, British, and French imperialists who wanted to create . . . . a worth-while ally for France in case of future trouble. As far as I recollect, your experts also did not tell that Yugoslavia contains the Banat and the districts around Marburg (Maribor) with some 600,000 to 700,000 Germans who have been there since the reign of Maria Theresa and in the German-language island of Gottschee since the twelfth century!

The alleged "liberty" of the Serbs can also be interpreted as lawlessness. A number of their recent monarchs were murdered and others deposed. But nobody mentioned that nor the fact that the British government felt so outraged by the murder of Alexander and Draga in 1903 by a military camarilla that it refused to have diplomatic relations with King Peter (grandfather of the present boy-king) for seven years and kept its legation in Belgrade closed. The murder of the royal couple was particularly brutal because they were thrown out of the windows of the Royal Palace.

Maćek, the Croat leader, only jointed the new cabinet because he thought it a way of maintaining peace, but it will be found that neither the Croats nor the Slovenes will support

their oppressors, the Serbs, in war. It is said that Maćek himself returned to Zagreb and apparently did not assume office, which was . . . . of little importance.

Both Croats and Slovenes feel very "Austrian," and the former especially filled many of the highest posts in the Hapsburg army. The commander-in-chief of the imperial armies facing Italy during the World War, General or Field Marshal Boreović, was a Croat. But the Serbs trusted the Croats so little that they would have none of them in their army in important places.

It will be seen, therefore, that Yugoslavia is neither a homogeneous nor a contented nation and that the crocodile tears of certain "high-placed" individuals of this country are not at all in place. Yugoslavia, a creation of the victors of the last war, will again break up through the present one, because it is an unnatural product which carried in it at its birth the seeds of its destruction.

A. O. T., New York

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100. *Is Russia Losing in Finland?*
101. *Tariff Walls*
102. *War Myths*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
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138. *Polls and the Election*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*
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146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

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147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
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WHICH ROAD FOR AMERICA—

Staying Out of War or a Military Defeat of Germany?

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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APRIL 20, 1941

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FREDERICK SCHUMAN, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College

ALFRED M. BINGHAM, Editor of *Common Sense*

NEIL H. JACOBY, Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Chicago

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SUGGESTED READINGS

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"If America Stands Alone," *New Republic,* March 17, 1941.

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